Abstract
This paper examines the global impact of China’s interpretation and application of international maritime law, particularly its behavior in the South China Sea. While China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its flexible and selective compliance undermines the rules-based maritime order. Through an analysis of China’s “nine-dash line,” the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, and the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations with ASEAN, this paper argues that China’s approach represents a strategic form of “lawfare” that prioritizes control and power projection over legal principles. The implications are far-reaching, threatening not only regional stability but also global economic and legal order.
Keywords: South China Sea, UNCLOS, China, lawfare, maritime security, international law
1. Why We Should Care: The Global Impact of China’s Maritime Law
Kardon (2023) opens the debate by emphasizing that China’s interpretation of maritime law is not merely a regional dispute but a global concern. The South China Sea and its surrounding waters function as the backbone of global trade, handling roughly one-third of all maritime commerce (World Bank, 2023). The interconnected web of technological supply chains, intermediate goods, and essential commodities relies on stable and predictable maritime governance in this region.
The fragility of this system became evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when global shipping disruptions and events such as the Ever Given blockage in the Suez Canal revealed the world economy’s vulnerability to maritime chokepoints (UNCTAD, 2021). Any disruption in the Indo-Pacific’s maritime order directly undermines global prosperity and peace. Thus, what China does in its surrounding seas sets a precedent that could either sustain or erode the foundations of the global maritime system.
If China’s approach, where political might overrides international law, is replicated by other states, it could usher in a disorderly, less peaceful, and less prosperous maritime world. The stakes extend far beyond Southeast Asia, implicating the entire global system of trade, law, and governance.
2. How China Views and Uses International Maritime Law
Although China is a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its adherence is markedly different from that of rule-of-law states such as the United States or Japan. China does not perceive law as a constraint but as an instrument of statecraft. From Beijing’s perspective, treaties such as UNCLOS are tools to advance national interests rather than to bind the state within a normative framework (Zhang, 2020).
This instrumental approach manifests in selective compliance and interpretive flexibility. China employs legal language and international norms when advantageous, while ignoring or reinterpreting provisions that limit its claims. This utilitarian use of law reflects the broader tradition of fa zhi in Chinese governance, where law serves the state, not the citizen (Peerenboom, 2014).
The result is friction with neighboring countries, including Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which rely on UNCLOS as a rational mechanism for allocating maritime rights, fisheries, oil, and gas jurisdiction. For these states, UNCLOS represents a codified balance of sovereignty and cooperation. For China, however, it remains a living instrument of strategic leverage. This divergence in interpretation destabilizes not only regional norms but also the credibility of international maritime law as a universal regime.
3. The “Nine-Dash Line” and the Reality of UNCLOS
A central tension lies in China’s assertion of the “nine-dash line,” which encompasses nearly 80% of the South China Sea. This claim conflicts directly with the UNCLOS framework that defines a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from a coastal baseline. Because the claimed waters overlap with the EEZs of neighboring archipelagic states, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, the “nine-dash line” lacks any legal validity under UNCLOS (Beckman, 2017).
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague delivered a landmark ruling that invalidated China’s maritime claims under the “nine-dash line.” The tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China’s claims had “no legal basis” under international law (PCA, 2016). Despite the clarity of this judgment, China rejected the decision, asserting that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and that the ruling infringed upon its sovereignty.
Instead of moderating its stance, Beijing intensified its physical presence and operational control. It constructed artificial islands, established military installations, deployed coast guard and maritime militia units, and created a de facto maritime frontier. These measures represent a deliberate effort to replace legal claims with physical control, embodying the principle that “possession is nine-tenths of the law.” The legal defeat thus evolved into a strategic consolidation, redefining the South China Sea as a contested domain where might trumps right.
4. Lawfare and Enforcement of Claims at Sea
China’s maritime strategy intertwines legal argumentation with coercive enforcement, an approach often termed lawfare. By maintaining a steady stream of ambiguous legal claims, China effectively reshapes the cognitive map of maritime entitlements. Through repeated assertions, official maps, and maritime patrols, Beijing normalizes control that is legally questionable but strategically effective (Kardon, 2018).
The Scarborough Shoal dispute illustrates this phenomenon vividly. Since 2012, China has enforced a de facto exclusion zone extending 25-30 nautical miles around the shoal, exceeding the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit permissible for a “rock” under Article 121 of UNCLOS. Chinese coast guard and militia vessels regularly intercept Philippine fishermen, imposing an informal but consistent maritime boundary.
Such actions constitute a hybrid strategy that fuses diplomatic persuasion, administrative regulation, and coercive presence. China also draws straight baselines around disputed archipelagos and declares maritime preserves under environmental pretexts, legally dubious measures that reinforce its claim of “continuous administration.” As Kardon (2023) notes, China’s philosophy of control prioritizes effective occupation over legal recognition. In this view, lawfare is not a substitute for force but a multiplier of its legitimacy.
5. The South China Sea Code of Conduct and Comparison with the United States
Negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) between China and ASEAN have stretched for more than two decades with negligible progress. For China, the process itself serves as a strategic end: prolonging dialogue divides ASEAN, dilutes collective bargaining, and provides a diplomatic shield against external criticism (Thayer, 2022).
By sustaining an endless negotiation cycle, China avoids making binding commitments while projecting an image of cooperation. Kardon (2023) argues that this approach allows Beijing to manage, rather than resolve, the dispute. The likely outcome is a diluted agreement that codifies the status quo of Chinese dominance under the guise of “regional consensus.”
In contrast, the United States, though criticized for its own maritime interventions, operates within a legal system that subjects executive action to constitutional scrutiny and public accountability. The supremacy clause ensures that international law, once ratified, binds domestic conduct. China, however, lacks such internal legal constraints. The Communist Party remains above the law, both domestically and internationally, allowing unparalleled strategic flexibility. This asymmetry between a rule-of-law state and a rule-by-law system reveals why China’s maritime behavior cannot be moderated through conventional legal diplomacy alone.
6. Conclusion: The Future of the Maritime Order
China’s reinterpretation of international maritime law signals a disturbing departure from the rules-based global order that has governed the seas since the mid-twentieth century. By subordinating law to power, China redefines legality as a function of capacity, not consensus. This paradigm shift threatens small coastal nations that rely on international law to safeguard their maritime rights against larger powers.
If other states emulate China’s model, the world could regress into a maritime environment characterized by unilateralism, coercion, and instability. Such a future would erode the cooperative norms that underpin global trade, environmental protection, and maritime security. The South China Sea, therefore, is not merely a regional flashpoint but a testing ground for the resilience of international law itself.
Restoring a stable maritime order requires a multifaceted response: reinforcing UNCLOS mechanisms, enhancing the capacity of regional states to assert lawful claims, and revitalizing global confidence in multilateral dispute resolution. Whether the future seas are governed by law or by power will determine not only the fate of Southeast Asia but the trajectory of global peace and prosperity.
References
- Beckman, R. (2017). UNCLOS and the South China Sea disputes: Challenges and opportunities. Ocean Development & International Law, 48(1), 1–25.
- Kardon, I. (2018). China’s Law of the Sea: The new rules of maritime order. Harvard University Press.
- Kardon, I. (2023). China’s maritime lawfare: Power, control, and the future of the Indo-Pacific. Foreign Affairs.
- Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). (2016). The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award of 12 July 2016. The Hague.
- Peerenboom, R. (2014). China’s long march toward rule of law. Cambridge University Press.
- Thayer, C. (2022). ASEAN, China, and the Code of Conduct: Endless negotiations and shifting power. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 44(3), 395–418.
- UNCTAD. (2021). Review of maritime transport 2021. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- World Bank. (2023). World trade indicators: Maritime transport and global logistics.
