Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic implications of Indonesia’s defense modernization, specifically the purchase of 42 Chengdu J-10 fighter jets from China and joint exercises with Russia, for its security partnership with Australia. Using a foreign policy analysis approach, this study argues that Indonesia’s measures represent an assertion of the free and active principle in facing the increasingly compartmentalized geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s response, articulated by ADF Chief Admiral David John Stone, respecting Indonesia’s decision while voicing open concerns, reflects the complexity of managing differences in strategic orientation between a US ally and a non-aligned state. It is concluded that the resilience of the bilateral relationship going forward will depend on the capacity to maintain honest dialogue, strategic transparency, and mutual understanding of each other’s national security interests, as also tested by the signing of the Australia-Papua New Guinea Defense Treaty (The Pukpuk Treaty) in October 2024.
Keywords: Indonesia’s Defense Modernization, Free and Active Policy, Indonesia-Australia Relations, Indo-Pacific Geopolitics, Regional Security, Defense Equipment.
1. Context – Defense Equipment Modernization within the Framework of a Free and Active Policy
In recent months, Indonesia’s defense policy has drawn regional attention with the announced plan to procure 42 Chengdu J-10 fighter jets from China and the holding of joint military exercises with the Russian Navy in the Java Sea waters in November 2024. These strategic decisions, announced directly by the Indonesian Minister of Defense, cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical context in the Indo-Pacific region, where strategic competition between major powers creates complex security dynamics and demands middle powers like Indonesia to carefully manage its defense posture. As a country adhering to the free and active foreign policy principle, Indonesia consistently refuses to be bound to any single power bloc, a principle that forms the legitimizing foundation for the diversification of its defense equipment supply sources and defense cooperation networks. This modernization plan is an integral part of a long-term effort to renew the core strength of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), a majority of whose military equipment has reached an advanced age, thus requiring refreshment and enhancement of technical-operational capabilities to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). An official statement from the Head of the Bureau of Defense Planning and Cooperation at the Ministry of Defense, Brig. Gen. TNI Frega Wenas, affirms that this force posture development is placed within the framework of national development and humanitarian interests, indicating Indonesia’s approach which seeks to balance security needs with regional stability.
2. Problem Analysis – Strategic Dissonance in the Indonesia-Australia Partnership
These Indonesian defense modernization steps, although a sovereign right, naturally create potential friction points in its strategic partnership with Australia, a country with a fundamentally different security orientation as a key ally of the United States. This strategic dissonance is manifested in the implicit concerns that both parties try to manage, where Australia has been actively engaged in exclusive security alliances like AUKUS, which facilitates its access to nuclear-powered submarine technology, while Indonesia views such developments as potentially triggering a military escalation in the region that contradicts the ZOPFAN principle. These asymmetrical perceptions are further exacerbated by the signing of the Australia-Papua New Guinea Defense Treaty, named The Pukpuk Treaty, in October 2024, which contains mutual defense clauses causing anxiety in Jakarta considering the security vulnerabilities in the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border region and the presence of active armed criminal groups in Papua Province. The historical background of the bilateral relationship, once marked by the incident of Australian wiretapping of President SBY and other Indonesian officials in 2013, adds a layer of complexity and suspicion that must be continually managed, creating a strategic memory that causes any defense move by one party to be interpreted very cautiously by the other.
3. Analysis of Australia’s Response – Security Diplomacy and Concern Management
Australia’s official response, articulated by the Chief of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Admiral David John Stone, during his visit to Jakarta in October 2024, demonstrates a mature and pragmatic approach to security diplomacy. Instead of issuing confrontational statements, Admiral Stone explicitly stated Australia’s respect for Indonesia’s sovereign right to make defense decisions based on its own national interests, while expressing high confidence in the resilience of the long-standing bilateral relationship. This statement is a strategic effort to de-escalate potential tension and keep communication channels open, which is crucial for regional stability. However, this public diplomacy was accompanied by the open expression of concerns, particularly regarding Indonesia’s military cooperation with Russia, which he referred to as a country with “influence that can cause instability in the region“. This dual-track approach respects sovereignty while voicing concerns, demonstrating the complexity of Australia’s position, which must balance its commitment as a US ally with the imperative to maintain a productive cooperative relationship with its closest and largest neighbor, which has a different strategic philosophy.
4. Strategic Solutions – Strengthening a Resilient Engagement Framework
To ensure that these differences in perception and strategic orientation do not undermine the foundation of the long-term partnership, a more robust and resilient engagement framework built on key pillars is required. The first and most important pillar is the commitment to maintain and deepen open and honest security dialogue, as exemplified in the meeting between Admiral Stone and Defense Minister Safri and TNI Commander General Agus Subianto. Dialogue forums such as the 2+2 meeting between the Foreign and Defense Ministers of both countries need to be utilized more intensively and substantively, not merely as diplomatic rituals, but as a space to transparently discuss each other’s doctrines, force postures, and strategic concerns, including the implications of AUKUS for Indonesia and the purchase of defense equipment from third-party countries for Australia. The second pillar is to proactively identify and strengthen areas of non-traditional security cooperation that have a direct impact on community welfare, such as humanitarian operations and disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and maritime security in shared waters, thereby creating a base of common interest that can support the relationship when disagreements arise on traditional security issues.
5. Implementation Actions – From Vision to Concrete Practice
The implementation of these strategic solutions requires a series of concrete and sustainable policy actions. First, Indonesia and Australia could establish a Joint Security Working Group comprising military experts, academics, and defense ministry officials from both sides, with a mandate to regularly map threat perceptions, discuss operational doctrines, and design confidence-building measure scenarios to prevent misperceptions in the field. Second, in the context of the Pukpuk Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, Australia needs to consistently and proactively conduct consultations and provide transparent briefings to the Indonesian side, as has been initiated, to assure Jakarta that the treaty is not intended to interfere with Indonesian sovereignty or support separatist movements, but solely for Papua New Guinea’s internal stability. Third, both countries should expand the scale and complexity of non-offensive joint military exercises, such as tsunami disaster relief exercises and peacekeeping operations, which not only enhance technical interoperability but also build trust and personal understanding among TNI and ADF personnel, ultimately becoming the most effective adhesive for the relationship during diplomatic crises.
6. Conclusion
Indonesia’s defense modernization through the purchase of defense equipment from China and cooperation with Russia is essentially a firm reaffirmation of the free and active foreign policy principle amidst an increasingly competitive strategic environment. This step is not aimed at confronting Australia or any bloc, but is a rational strategy to maintain strategic autonomy and create the necessary balance of power in a multipolar international system. Australia’s measured response, combining respect for sovereignty with the open expression of concerns, indicates a level of maturity in a partnership that has weathered various historical tests. The sustainability and resilience of the Indonesia-Australia relationship going forward will not be measured by the absence of differences, but by the capacity of both capitals to constructively manage these differences through inclusive dialogue mechanisms, bold strategic transparency, and an unwavering commitment to finding common ground in shared regional security interests. The decision to purchase the Chengdu J-10 aircraft and conduct exercises with Russia, therefore, should be seen not as an obstacle, but as a catalyst for building a more mature, equal, and mutually respectful security relationship between these two strategic neighbors.
The author, Dr. Surya Wiranto, SH MH, is a retired Rear Admiral of the Indonesian Navy, Advisor to Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI), Senior Advisory Group member of IKAHAN Indonesia–Australia, Lecturer at the Postgraduate Program on Maritime Security at the Indonesian Defense University, Head of the Kejuangan Department at PEPABRI, Member of FOKO, Secretary-General of the IKAL Strategic Center and Executive Director of the Indonesia Institute for Maritime Studies (IIMS). He is also active as a Lawyer, Receiver, and Mediator at the Legal Jangkar Indonesia law firm.
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